The problem of designing Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational and revenue maximizing auction for multiple goods and flexible customers is considered. The auctioneer has M goods and N potential customers. Customer i has a flexibility set φi which represents the set of goods the customer is equally interested in. Customer i can consume at most one good from its flexibility set. We first characterize the optimal auction for customers with arbitrary flexibility sets and then consider the case when the flexibility sets are nested. This allows us to group customers into classes of increasing flexibility. We show that the optimal auction can be simplified in this case and we provide a complete characterization of allocations and payments in terms of simple thresholds.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of allocating limited resources among strategic users with private information is often addressed through the framework of auctions or mechanism design. An auctioneer/mechanism designer would typically ask for bids from potential customers, and allocate resources and charge payments as a function of the received bids. Customers with private information about their utilities can be strategic about what bids they submit. The auction design problem is to find allocation and payment functions which map the customers' bids to allocations and payments so that the auctioneer can achieve some desired objective. Typically, the auctioneer's objectives are either maximization of its revenue or maximization of social welfare.
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions for multiple goods and flexible customers. Customer flexibility about goods can arise in different scenarios. In demand response programs of electric utilities, some customers may be flexible about when they receive power. In airline/hotel reservation settings, customers may be flexible about their travel dates. The seller of these goods/services should be able to take this flexibility into account to improve its profits.
We consider a setting where the auctioneer has M goods and N potential customers. Customer i has a flexibility set φ i which represents the set of goods the customer is equally interested in. Customer i can consume at most one good from its flexibility set. Our goal is to design a Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational and revenue-maximizing auction for this setting. We first characterize such an auction for customers with arbitrary flexibility sets and then consider the case when the flexibility sets are nested. This allows us to group customers into classes of increasing flexibility. We show that the optimal auction can be simplified in this case S. Navabi and A. Nayyar are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Southern California, 3740 McClintock Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA (Email: navabiso@usc.edu; ashutosn@usc.edu) and we provide a complete characterization of allocations and payments in terms of simple thresholds.
The problem of allocating multiple goods to several customers with special preferences over the set of offered items has long been studied in the context of combinatorial auctions [1, Chapter 11] . Numerous works have addressed social welfare maximizing or efficient auction design, the most well-known of these being the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ([2], [3] , [4] ). Several works have addressed instances of the revenue-maximizing auction design problem with certain assumptions about users' private information and their utility functional forms that make the problem more tractable. In his seminal paper [5] , Myerson derives fundamental results for the revenue maximizing single-object auction problem. Armstrong [6] extended the analysis to the case where two objects are to be allocated. Hartline et al [7] , survey various solution approaches for addressing revenueoptimal auctions in cases where users' private information is unidimensional. Avery et al. [8] studied bundling effects in multi-object auctions under linearity assumptions for utility functions. Some recent works have modeled complementarities among the goods in multi-object auctions by imposing the assumption of having single-minded buyers who are interested in certain subsets of items or bundles for which they are willing to pay. Ledyard [9] characterizes a revenue maximizing dominant strategy auction for singleminded buyers. Abhishek and Hajek [10] consider the same problem of revenue optimal auction design for single-minded bidders with the users' preferred bundle being their private information.
A. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we discuss the problem formulation and the mechanism setup in section II. In section III, we characterize incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints for the mechanism and show that the optimal allocations are the solution to an integer program. In section IV, we consider the case of nested flexibility sets and simplify the optimal allocation and payments for this setting. We summarize our findings and briefly point out potential extensions to the current framework in section V.
B. Notations
{0, 1} N ×M is the space of N × M dimensional matrices with entries that are either 0 or 1. For the set A, |A| denotes the cardinality of A. Z + is the set of positive integers. x + is the positive part of the real number x, that is, x + = max(x, 0). Vector inequalities are component-wise; that is, for two 1×n dimensional vectors u = (u 1 , · · · , u n ) and v = (v 1 , · · · , v n ), u ≤ v implies that u i ≤ v i , for i = 1, · · · , n. 1 {.} is the indicator function and 1 {a≤b} denotes 1 if the inequality in the subscript is true and 0 otherwise.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a setup where an auctioneer has M goods and N potential customers. M = {1, 2, · · · , M } denotes the set of goods and N = {1, 2, · · · , N } denotes the set of potential customers. Customer i, i ∈ N , has a flexibility set φ i ⊂ M which represents the set of goods the customer is equally interested in. Customer i can consume at most one good from its flexibility set φ i . We assume the flexibility sets of all customers are common knowledge.
Customer i's utility for receiving a good from φ i is θ i . We assume that θ i is customer i's private information and is unknown to other users as well as the auctioneer. We assume that θ i s are independent random variables, each distributed over the set Θ i = [θ min i , θ max i ] according to some probability density function f i (.) with its corresponding cumulative distribution function F i (.). We define θ := (θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ N )
Let us define a N × M dimensional matrix A with the entries [a ij ] such that a ij = 1 if customer i gets good j and 0 otherwise. The matrix A is called an allocation matrix. We impose the natural constraints that each of the M available goods can be allocated to at most one customer and that each customer receives at most one good. This implies that
A binary matrix A ∈ {0, 1} N ×M that satisfies these two constraints is called a feasible allocation matrix. Let S ⊂ {0, 1} N ×M denote the set of all feasible allocation matrices. That is,
Given an allocation matrix A and a payment t i charged to customer i, the net utility for this customer is
We consider a direct revelation mechanism where customer i, i ∈ N , reports a valuation from the set Θ i to the auctioneer. The customers can lie about their valuations. The mechanism consists of an allocation rule q and a payment rule t. The allocation rule q is a function from the valuation profile space Θ to the set of feasible allocation matrices S. The payment rule is a mapping from Θ to R N with the ith component t i being the payment charged to customer i.
The auctioneer's objective is to find a mechanism that maximizes its expected revenue while satisfying Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality constraints. We describe these constraints below.
Consider a mechanism (q, t) and suppose customers report valuations r := (r 1 , . . . , r N ) 1 . The mechanism then results in an allocation matrix q(r) and payments t(r). Define ψ i (r) as:
Customer i's utility function can then be written in terms of its true valuation θ i and the reported valuations r as
In a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, truthful reporting of valuations constitutes an equilibrium of the Bayesian game induced by the mechanism. In other words, each customer would prefer to report his true valuation provided that all other customers have adopted truth-telling strategy. This implies that the mechanism must satisfy the following inequalities:
Individual Rationality (IR) constraint implies that the customer's expected utility at the truthful reporting equilibrium is non-negative. This can be expressed as:
The auction design problem can now be written as
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF BIC AND IR MECHANISMS Suppose all customers other than i report their valuations truthfully. We can then define customer i's expected allocation and payment under the mechanism (q, t) when it reports r i ∈ Θ i as:
(8) Using the above definitions, we can rewrite equations (5) and (6) as:
We can now derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a direct-revelation mechanism to be Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational.
Theorem 1: A mechanism (q, t) satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints if and only if Q i (r i ) is non-decreasing in r i and
where,
The proof is similar to the arguments used in chapters 2-3 of [11] for characterizing BIC and IR mechanisms.
We can now use the result of Theorem 1 to simplify the optimization problem in equation (7) . Let us rewrite auctioneer's expected revenue as
For a BIC and IR mechanism, we can use the results in Theorem 1 to plug in the expression for T i (θ i ). Simplifying the terms, we then get:
where
and is referred to as the customer's virtual type/virtual valuation in economics terminology.
Recall from (3) that ψ i (θ) = j∈φi q ij (θ). Therefore, the integral in (14) is completely determined by the choice of the allocation function q(·). Also, recall that K i ≤ 0 (equation (12)). Therefore, a mechanism (q, t) that maximizes the integral in (14) and ensures K i = 0 would provide the largest expected revenue. In order to simplify the maximization problem, we assume that virtual types θ i − 1−Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
are increasing in θ i . Such a condition holds if fi(θi) 1−Fi(θi) is increasing in θ i , which is to say that f i has increasing hazard rate 2 .
The following theorem characterizes the optimal mechanism under the increasing hazard rate condition.
Theorem 2: Consider the allocation and tax functions (q * , t * ) defined below 2 An example of a distribution with increasing hazard rate is the uniform distribution.
Then, under the increasing hazard rate condition, (q * , t * ) is the revenue-maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism, i.e., (q * , t * ) is a solution of the maximization problem in (7) .
Proof: See Appendix I. The optimal allocation matrix q * (θ) given in (15) is the solution of an integer program and hence computationally hard to obtain. Moreover, each valuation profile θ ∈ Θ requires the solution of a different integer program. Similarly, the characterization of payments given by (16) is not very useful from a computational viewpoint as it requires the solution of a continuum of integer programs. In the next section, we will impose a structure on the customers' flexibility sets and show how it can be leveraged to simplify the optimal mechanism. IV. OPTIMAL MECHANISM FOR NESTED FLEXIBILITY SETS We assume now that the flexibility sets of customers can be one of k nested sets. That is, we have k nested subsets of the set of goods:
and
There are several markets whose demand structures resemble this nested pattern. For example, flexible electricity consumers may need a fixed amount of energy within a certain deadline [12] , [13] . Assuming that each consumer needs 1 unit of energy, all consumers present at the current time can be grouped according to their deadlines. Lett i denote consumer i's deadline. Let B τ , τ = 1, 2, · · · , k denote the set of power units available for delivery in the interval [0, τ ]. Clearly, B 1 ⊂ B 2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ B k . For consumer i with deadlinet i , the flexibility set φ i = Bt i .
Based on their flexibility sets, we can divide the customers into k classes: C l is the set of customers with flexibility set B l . Clearly, N = k i=1 C i and C i ∩ C j = ∅ ∀i = j. We define n l := |C l |, l = 1, . . . , k, m l := |B l \ B l−1 |, l = 2, . . . , k , m 1 := |B 1 |.
We also define the vectors n and m as n := (n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n k ) , m := (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m k ).
The vector n is referred to as the demand profile and the vector m is referred to as the supply profile.
A. Supply Adequacy Problem
Before describing the optimal mechanism for the above setup, we will need to answer two questions: 1) Given a supply profile m and a demand profile n, can the available goods be used to satisfy all customers? In other words, does there exist an allocation matrix
The above conditions on A ensure that each customer gets a good from its flexibility set and that a good is not allocated to multiple customers. If such an allocation matrix exists, we say that the supply profile m is adequate for the demand profile n. 2) If the supply profile m is not adequate for the demand profile n, what is the minimum number of customers that must be removed to achieve adequacy? Borrowing ideas from [14] , we provide answers to the above questions in Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Lemma 1: We say that n ≺ w m if the following k inequalities hold:
The supply profile m is adequate for the demand profile n if and only if n ≺ w m. Proof: See Appendix II. If the supply profile m is not adequate, we may have to remove some customers from the demand profile. Consider a demand profileñ ≤ n obtained by removing some customers. This new demand profile will result in adequacy if and only ifñ ≺ w m. The minimum number of customers to be removed to achieve adequacy can be written as the following optimization problem:
The above integer program has a simple solution described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Define r * 1 := (n 1 − m 1 ) + . For 2 ≤ j ≤ k, recursively define r * j as the solution of the following onedimensional integer program:
Then, k i=1 r * i is the minimum value of the integer program in (22).
Proof: See Appendix III.
B. Allocation Rule
We can now use the results of section IV-A to find the optimal allocation for a given valuation profile θ. Recall from Theorem 2 that the optimal allocation is given as
Optimal Allocation: We describe this in several steps: 1) Firstly, any customer l with w l (θ l ) ≤ 0 is immediately removed from consideration (that is, it is not allocated any good). Since virtual valuation is an increasing function of true valuation, w l (θ l ) ≤ 0 if and only if θ l ≤ θ res l , where θ res l is a threshold based on the probability distribution of θ l . This threshold is called the reserve price for the customer. For each class of customers, we define the subset of users with positive virtual valuations:
Let n + i = |C + i |. Define r * 1 , . . . , r * k as in Lemma 2 by replacing n i with n + i . 2) Let L 1 := C + 1 . From L 1 , r * 1 customers with the lowest valuations are removed from consideration 3 . The set of remaining customers in L 1 is denoted by N 1 .
3) We proceed iteratively: For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, given the set
Remove r * i customers with lowest valuations from L i . The set of remaining customers in L i is now defined as N i . 4) After the k th iteration, all customers in N k are allocated a good from their respective flexibility sets.
The optimality of the above allocation can be intuitively explained as follows: Firstly, it is clear that an optimal allocation should not give a good to customers with nonpositive virtual valuations. Among the remaining customers of class C 1 , at least r * 1 customers cannot be served. It is easy to see that the r * 1 customers with the lowest valuations should be removed. This argument can be used iteratively. At the ith iteration, at least r * i customers need to be removed otherwise the ith adequacy inequality would be violated. An optimal allocation should remove r * i customers with lowest valuations.
The optimal allocation can also be described using k thresholds. Define θ thr i := (r * i ) th lowest valuation in L i , i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (25) Therefore, at iteration i, customers that have valuations less than or equal to θ thr i defined in (25) will be removed from the set L i . Recall that ψ * l (θ) = j∈φ l q * lj (θ) is 1 if customer l gets a good from its flexibility set and 0 otherwise. Under the optimal allocation, customer l in class C i gets a desired good if its valuation exceeds its reserve price θ res l as well as the the thresholds θ thr i , θ thr i+1 , · · · , θ thr k . Thus, we have ψ * l (θ) = 1 if θ l > max{θ res l , θ thr i , θ thr i+1 , · · · , θ thr k } 0 otherwise ∀l ∈ C i , ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k.
(26)
C. Payment Functions
We can now use the optimal allocation rule described in section IV-B to simplify customers' payment functions. For customer l in class C i define d il := max{θ res l , θ thr i , θ thr i+1 , · · · , θ thr k }. From equation (16) the optimal payment function for customer l in flexibility class C i has the following form:
Using the definition of ψ * l (θ) given in equation (26), t l (θ) can be simplified as:
2) If θ l ≤ d il , t l (θ) = 0.
If the reserve prices are the same for all customers, then the payment function can be simplified as follows: For a customer in class C i define d i := max{θ res , θ thr i , θ thr i+1 , · · · , θ thr k }. The tax function for customer l in class C i simplifies to: t l (θ) = d i 1 {θ l >di} . It is evident in this case that more flexible customers pay less for the good than less flexible customers.
The optimal allocation decisions and payments can thus be easily computed through the straightforward threshold-based procedure constructed in sections IV-B and IV-C. By using the nested structure of the flexibility sets, this procedure obviates the need to solve the computationally hard integer program formulated in Theorem 2.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of designing revenue maximizing auctions for allocating multiple items to flexible customers. Assuming customers' flexibility sets to be common knowledge, we characterized the allocation rule for an incentive compatible, individually rational and revenue-maximizing auction as the solution to an integer program. The corresponding payment rule was described by an integral equation. We then considered the case when the flexibility sets are nested. This allows us to group customers into classes of increasing flexibility. We showed that the optimal auction can be simplified in this case and we provide a complete characterization of allocations and payments in terms of simple thresholds.
The model we considered needs to be further extended to analyze the more general problem where customers' flexibility sets are part of their private information. In this case, customers have two-dimensional types (that is, valuation and flexibility set) which can be strategically misreported in multiple ways. This complicates the design of an incentive compatible mechanism. Another future direction is to allow for online mechanisms where the set of customers and/or goods can change over time.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To establish that the mechanism (q * , t * ) is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, note that because of Theorem 1, it suffices to show that customer i's expected payment on reporting r i , T i (r i ) satisfies (11) and the expected allocation, Q i (r i ) is non-decreasing in r i . By taking the expectation over θ −i in (16), it is easily established that the expected payment satisfies (11) with K i = 0.
In order to establish monotonicity of Q * i (.), it can be argued that ψ * i (θ i , θ −i ) is non-decreasing in θ i for all θ −i ∈ Θ −i ; the proof is similar to the arguments in chapters 2-3 of [11] .
It is straightforward to see that allocation rule q * (θ) which is defined in equation (15) as the maximizer of the weighted
, will naturally maximize the integral term in equation (14) and thus maximize the auctioneer's total expected revenue. Hence, the mechanism (q * , t * ) is a solution of the maximization problem in (7) .
APPENDIX II PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Necessity: From the adequacy condition in equation (20) we have:
Taking the summation of both sides over the set of customers in the union of first J classes, we get:
The left hand side of (30) can be written as
(30) and (31) imply that:
which proves the necessity part of the lemma.
Sufficiency:
We can enumerate the items in the sets B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B k as B i = 1, 2, · · · , i j=1 m j , i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The customers in classes C i , i = 1, 2, · · · , k can be enumerated as C 1 = 1, 2, · · · , n 1 and C i = 1 + i−1 j=1 n j , · · · , i j=1 n j , i = 2, 3, · · · , k.
Consider an allocation where the j th customer (as per the above enumeration) gets the j th good (as per the above enumeration). Thus, A(i, i) = 1 , ∀ i ∈ N and A(i, j) = 0 , for j = i. Since
m i , ∀l = 1, 2, · · · , k, one can verify that customer j will always get something from her flexibility set φ j . Therefore, given the inequalities in (21), an allocation matrix can be found that satisfies the conditions in (20), which is to say that the supply profile m is adequate for the demand profile n.
APPENDIX III PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Consider any feasible solution of the optimization problem in (22) denoted as (ñ 1 ,ñ 2 , · · · ,ñ k ). We will now show inductively that: i j=1 (n j −ñ j ) ≥ i j=1 r * j , ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , k (33)
For i = 1 we have:
From this we can write:
Now suppose the inequality in (33) holds for i. We now want to prove it also holds for i + 1. Let us consider two cases based on the possible values of r * i+1 : 1) r i+1 = 0 and 2) r * i+1 > 0. When r * i+1 = 0, from the induction hypothesis for i in (33) we can write: i+1 j=1 (n j −ñ j ) ≥ i+1 j=1 r * j .
Now consider the case when r * i+1 > 0. In this case, from the optimization constraint in (23) it can be verified that
(n j − m j ).
(37)
From the optimization constraints in (22) we can write: 
Thus the inequality in (33) holds for i + 1 as well. Therefore by induction we can conclude that:
To show that the lower bound above is achievable, consider the following procedure: 1) Let L 1 := C 1 . From L 1 , r * 1 customers are removed. The set of remaining customers in L 1 is denoted by N 1 . 2) Proceed iteratively: For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, given the set N i−1 , define L i := N i−1 C i . Remove r * i customers from L i . The set of remaining customers in L i is now defined as N i . It can be verified that the above procedure removes exactly k j=1 r * j customers and creates a supply profileñ that meets the adequacy condition.
